No electoral law is ever perfect. In pluralistic societies with complex social structures, the key criterion for assessing electoral laws is how effectively they ensure fair representation for all components. In Lebanon, since the early 1990s coup against the Taif Agreement, electoral laws have been tailored to serve Syria and its allies, without maintaining even a minimal standard of consistency—ensuring Damascus's grip on Lebanon’s political and legislative landscape.

A prime example of this manipulation was the arbitrary increase in parliamentary seats from 108 to 128, contradicting the Taif Agreement, and the inconsistent distribution of these seats across electoral districts. Christian seats were added in areas with a weaker Christian presence, while districts with a larger Christian electorate were underrepresented. The electoral law was often drafted in Anjar, alongside the fabrication of candidates with no real representative weight. This was evident in the 2000 elections, when Syria sought to diminish the influence of the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, leading to what became known as the "Ghazi Kanaan Law".

Despite Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon on April 26, 2005, the 2000 electoral law remained in place, hindering Christian representation. It resulted in Christians electing fewer than 20 out of their 64 allotted seats through their own votes, while also blocking independent candidates from breaking through. At the time, Maronite Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, a key figure in Lebanon’s independence movement, raised his voice: "The constitution grants us 64 MPs; we must be able to elect them."

The 2009 elections were held under the 1960 electoral law, reinstated through the Doha Agreement after strong lobbying by the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), which claimed victory with the slogan: "Aoun restored the rights to their owners." However, this law ultimately failed to improve representation accuracy.

A long process of electoral reform followed, leading to repeated election postponements. Amid political maneuvering, the controversial Orthodox Electoral Law was proposed, but eventually, in 2017, a new proportional representation law was passed—known as the "Georges Adwan Law", in recognition of his role in its drafting. Its adoption was facilitated by the political consensus following Michel Aoun’s presidential election and the Maarab Agreement.

The Debate Over the 2017 Law

Critics have mocked the law for allowing a candidate with 50 votes to win while another with 5,000 votes loses. However, they overlooked the fact that voters cast ballots for party lists with a preferential vote system. The more votes a list accumulates, the more seats it secures—meaning voters primarily choose a political direction, not just individuals.

Others have complained that the proportional system exposed inflated political sizes that were previously hidden by the majoritarian system. The law ended the dominance of electoral machines that once marginalized Christian voters. For instance, in Akkar, a district with seven seats, Christian voters were often overpowered by the Sunni majority, allowing the Future Movement to handpick Christian MPs. Similarly, in Baalbek-Hermel, Hezbollah’s dominance allowed it to sweep the two Christian and two Sunni seats, alongside its six Shiite seats.

The 2017 law improved Christian representation, enabling them to elect around 50 MPs through their own votes. It also facilitated the election of independent MPs and October 17 uprising candidates, achieving historic breakthroughs in districts like Hasbaya-Marjeyoun, Beirut I & II, and others.

Renewed Calls for Change

With more than a year until the next parliamentary elections, familiar calls to overhaul the current law are resurfacing, just as they did in 2018 and 2022. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, known for his political acumen, is attempting to dilute the law’s effectiveness by introducing two preferential votes, which would distort proportionality. While this proposal wouldn’t alter seat distribution, it would grant parties with excess votes the power to determine the winners among their opponents.

For example, in Baalbek-Hermel, Hezbollah could direct its voters to cast their second preferential vote for the Maronite candidate on its list, ensuring the defeat of the Lebanese Forces’ candidate. A similar scenario unfolded in Zahle, where MP Bilal Al-Hashimi won thanks to surplus votes from the Lebanese Forces, only to later diverge from them on key issues—such as the nomination of Nawaf Salam for prime minister.

In a press interview on March 4, 2025, Berri defended his proposal, claiming it aims to "reduce sectarian voting and enhance political diversity." He argued that allowing voters to choose a candidate from their sect and another from a different sect would expand their options. However, election results prove otherwise. For instance, MP Antoine Habchi received thousands of Sunni and Shiite votes, while MP Mark Daou in Aley attracted significant Christian support.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, struck a different tone on March 10, 2025, stating: "We support the current electoral law unless better ideas are proposed." His shift in rhetoric suggests a realization that waging another electoral battle might be a losing cause, given the short time until the elections and the impracticality of imposing Hezbollah’s long-sought "single-district proportional law," which would solidify the numerical advantage of the Shiite electorate.

The Law: Imperfect but Necessary

The current law is far from being perfect, but in terms of representation accuracy, it leaps it is leaps ahead of previous laws. While electoral reforms are necessary, constant legislative instability is detrimental. At this point, any proposal to change the law is essentially an attempt to postpone the elections. More importantly, no viable alternative has been proposed to improve representation.

Necessary adjustments should focus on minor refinements, such as the six parliamentary seats allocated for expatriates—a system that complicates sectarian and geographic distributions while undermining the original goal of diaspora voting: keeping Lebanese expatriates connected to their homeland. Another pressing reform is the implementation of megacenters, which the current law allows but has yet to be enforced. Megacenters would free voters from electoral pressure and spare them the burden of traveling to their hometowns to vote.

Perhaps the best course of action is to follow the approach outlined by President Joseph Aoun in his inaugural speech: "My mandate will push, alongside future governments, toward improving electoral laws to promote power rotation, fair representation, transparency, and accountability." Any future discussions on electoral laws should aim at enhancing representation, not undermining it, and refining the system, not dismantling it for political gain.