The recent events along the Syrian coast have opened the door to a range of scenarios, darkened further by the fact that the crisis is still in its early stages. What is unfolding may not be confined to Syria’s internal fabric but could extend beyond its borders into a fragile regional environment.

The swift collapse of the previous regime, following a decisive blow to Iran’s protective axis, caught both Damascus' rulers and their Turkish backers off guard. They believed in an illusory and final stabilization of the situation in the heart of the Umayyad capital.

This came after the opposing axis momentarily bent under pressure, resorting to military and political maneuvering. Current President Ahmad Al-Sharaa and his allies assumed that Iran and Russia were now relics of the past. They sought to gradually dismantle Kurdish aspirations while postponing any resolution of the Druze issue, which was not seen as an immediate threat. Confident in the defeat of Alawites and pro-Assad minorities, they believed they could quietly consolidate power, rebuild Syria, and seek external support to revive an exhausted economy and feed a starving population.

Al-Sharaa ruled Damascus with an Idlib-based mindset, surrounding himself with loyalists—primarily those endorsed by Ankara. However, the inexperience of the new leadership, coupled with a vengeful approach toward other factions under the pretext of eradicating "remnants" of the Assad regime, hindered efforts to secure both internal and external legitimacy.

Like their predecessors who seized power in Syria through military force—starting with Husni al-Za'im’s coup in 1949—the new rulers faced relentless opposition from both domestic and foreign adversaries determined to topple them. Even Hafez al-Assad’s rule faced challenges in its early years, and his son, Bashar, ultimately succumbed to external pressures after 11 years in power when the right geopolitical conditions aligned against him.

A similar fate now looms over the new regime in Damascus, as various forces seek to destabilize Al-Sharaa. Those who directly lost the battle, such as Iran and Russia, are among them, alongside others who view an Islamist-led government backed by Turkey as a direct threat—most notably Israel. Meanwhile, Gulf states and other Arab nations, except Qatar, remain wary of radical Islamist rule.

From the moment Assad’s regime fell, its adversaries mobilized against the new authorities, which failed to establish an iron grip on the country. Drunk on their victory, they sidelined allies and positioned themselves as long-term rulers over a war-ravaged nation.

The burning of the Hussein bin Hamdan al-Khasibi shrine in Aleppo, just days after the "revolution’s" triumph, became the first major test for Syria’s new administration. It triggered unrest in the Alawite regions, which was later subdued through state-sanctioned violence.

This crackdown emboldened Damascus's leaders, who ignored Iraq’s precedent by disbanding the Syrian army, treating it as a vestige of the Assad era. However, turning 170,000 soldiers into jobless civilians in a country grappling with extreme hardship after 14 years of civil war, alongside mass dismissals from public institutions, created fertile ground for rebellion. Former high-ranking officers of the dissolved military orchestrated a well-organized insurgency, capitalizing on popular resentment rather than merely economic grievances.

The regime’s challenges multiplied as southern Syria effectively slipped from its control, falling under Israeli influence with a demilitarized zone imposed and direct warnings against advancing into Druze and Sunni areas.

Meanwhile, Kurdish regions, holding an estimated 80% of Syria’s oil reserves, remained in turmoil. In the west, Alawite communities erupted in defiance, shaking the coastal strongholds where Syria’s ports are located.

This escalating conflict has drawn in external powers, each with competing interests. Iran, having been sidelined, has cut off gas and oil supplies to Syria while maintaining strong influence over regional groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Russia, despite setbacks, remains determined to reclaim its foothold, preserving military bases and leveraging its role as a counterbalance to Turkish ambitions—an influence neither the U.S. nor Israel welcomes. While Israel favors partition, the U.S. prioritizes stability, accommodating Israeli interests while maintaining an uneasy balance of power. Washington remains committed to Kurdish forces, whose rise poses a constant headache for Ankara.

Containing Turkey’s influence in Damascus has become paramount. If unchecked, the situation could spiral out of control, leading to a far more dangerous social fragmentation than mere territorial division. The ripple effects could extend into neighboring states, potentially placing Turkey itself under the spotlight for disintegration.

Alawite factions have already sought Russian protection, while Iran has reasserted itself in the conflict. Israel dominates the south and shares control over eastern and northern regions with the Americans. Turkey maintains a firm grip over Sunni areas from Aleppo to Damascus, yet has not exerted significant pressure on Syria’s leadership.

In response, Al-Sharaa has made repeated public appearances, calling for a state of emergency and recruiting foreign fighters from Idlib and eastern regions to counter the latest Alawite insurgency. Attempts to pacify both internal dissent and international concerns have included calls for investigations—though no official mourning has been declared.

With sectarian rhetoric threatening Syria’s social fabric, the regime now faces an urgent choice: pursue a political resolution or risk deepening the crisis. The path forward demands outreach to all Syrian factions, paving the way for negotiations and reconciliation, alongside diplomatic engagement with foreign actors manipulating Syria’s internal strife.