The final communiqué of the “Syrian National Dialogue Conference", hastily convened, aimed to reassure the international actors, to ease criticism and achieve a lifting of the sanctions. However, beyond general statements, it clearly reflects the vision of the new rulers in Damascus regarding Syria’s future in the coming years.

This conference took place amid an ongoing turmoil, a legacy of a civil war whose chapters remain unfinished. Its primary objective was to lift international concerns by laying the foundations for a new Syria while demonstrating the leadership’s openness to various Syrian components, both politically and economically.

However, for Damascus, the top priority remains the lifting of the sanctions, which is essential to preserve the national unity—threatened from the east, north, south, and west. If an immediate lifting is not possible, a gradual easing or at least a partial freeze of sanctions would allow the new administration to breathe. Without such relief, it will struggle to maintain a solid footing, even with Turkish support, which is itself destabilized by a growing Israeli threat and American influence that aligns with Tel Aviv’s. Washington has hinted at its willingness to tolerate some Russian presence to curb the rise of Salafist rulers in Damascus.

A Stalled Reconstruction

Syria’s current leadership is seeking the lifting of sanctions to launch a massive reconstruction effort, estimated at $300 billion. However, the country’s infrastructure is in ruins, and the majority of the population lives below the poverty line, while the government lacks significant resources. For example, approximately 80% of Syria’s oil wealth is under Kurdish control in the northeast. Meanwhile, Arab support remains limited, hindered by the U.S. position against any easing of sanctions.

However, the conference failed to convince the international community, particularly in terms of inclusivity. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were excluded, as were numerous influential figures from religious minorities. Even among the Sunni community, the regime, under the guidance of Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, opted for individual rather than collective participation. This also applied to the Muslim Brotherhood, despite their supposed alignment with al-Sharaa, who himself comes from a Salafist background. This exclusion sparked discontent among Syrian Islamists and other factions of the historical opposition.

A Conference in a theatrical set

Critics have denounced al-Sharaa’s marginalization of key figures, turning the conference into mere political theater. For example, Ayman Al-Asfari, whom some participants had proposed as prime minister, ultimately left the discussions, along with other personalities. This reinforced the perception that al-Sharaa prioritizes radical Islamists from his camp over civilian figures. Yet, Al-Asfari, an Idlib native and businessman with international connections, resides in Britain and has often been compared to Rafic Hariri before his tenure as Lebanese Prime Minister.

Despite these setbacks, the conference attempted an institutional approach by forming specialized groups to address key national issues. Priority was given to centralizing military power, as the regime’s authority continues to weaken under regional pressure, with entire areas of religious and ethnic significance slipping beyond its control. Emphasis was also placed on maintaining national unity and condemning Israeli incursions through an official document, which serves as a basis for seeking support from international and regional organizations.

Uncertain Promises

The final communiqué included a series of ambitious statements: institutionalizing power, drafting a constitutional declaration, promoting citizenship and peaceful coexistence, rejecting violence and retaliation. However, it upheld the principle of transitional justice, signaling the continuation of purges of profiles from the former regime.

Yet, these commitments remain non-binding for the future transitional government, whose mandate is expected to last three years. Moreover, with no mention of democracy and amid widespread political exclusions, the Syrian leadership has offered nothing in response to Western demands.

This has reinforced Washington’s stance against lifting sanctions, while Europe—consistent with its approach during Bashar al-Assad’s rule—has unsuccessfully attempted to soften the U.S. position. The EU has pushed for a partial easing of the most severe sanctions, but its efforts have been so far useless.

Persistent Isolation

The lack of a genuine outreach to the historical opposition and the appointment of secondary roles to certain profiles to appease international criticism have only further distanced al-Sharaa from the West. Under these circumstances, the Caesar Act remains in force, blocking any economic recovery, reconstruction, or serious Arab financial assistance—even from Qatar, which had considered providing a financial deposit but was ultimately unable to proceed due to international restrictions.

All indications suggest that al-Sharaa will handpick the next prime minister from his Salafist-jihadist base, further consolidating his grip on institutions, much like previous Baathist and military leaders who have ruled Syria since Hosni al-Za’im’s coup in 1949.

In other words, the upcoming government will hardly differ from the current one, under the watchful eyes of the international community. The key concern for global actors is not whether the government presents itself as a technocratic body with a civilian façade or as an overtly Islamist administration. Rather, the focus is on whether it can implement serious reforms—something that appears unlikely, not only due to al-Sharaa and his circle’s constraints but also because of the country’s own looming challenges, which may prove to be as complex as they are dangerous.