Before Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa even arrived in Saudi Arabia, the agenda for his meeting with his Syrian counterpart, Murhaf Abu Qasra, had already been set. A political source told Agence France-Presse (AFP) that “the city of Jeddah will host a meeting between the defense ministers of Lebanon and Syria under Saudi sponsorship,” with discussions expected to focus on “securing the shared border and closing illegal crossings.”

Originally, Menassa was scheduled to visit Syria, a plan announced just days ago with the Lebanese delegation and agenda clearly outlined. However, a Syrian government source later confirmed the visit had been postponed due to “ongoing preparations to form a new government in Damascus.” Soon after, it was revealed that both ministers would instead meet in Saudi Arabia to discuss bilateral relations.

The choice of Saudi Arabia as the venue carries significant political weight. It signals the Kingdom’s potential new role as the official mediator between Beirut and Damascus, particularly after it facilitated the first-ever meeting between Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun and Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the Arab summit on Palestine in Cairo. Saudi Arabia reportedly pledged to organize and restructure this emerging relationship, starting with securing the border and curbing smuggling—especially of captagon, a major concern for the Kingdom.

Turkey had previously expressed interest in assuming this mediating role, but it’s now clear that Saudi Arabia is taking the lead, reasserting its influence in Lebanon through key political processes like the presidential and prime ministerial appointments. Yet, this move also signals a diminishing Qatari role in the Lebanon-Syria file, despite some attempts to present it as a coordinated approach between Doha and Riyadh.

The timing of the upcoming meeting is notable, coming just weeks after tensions flared along the Lebanon-Syria border. Clashes initially broke out between armed tribes and later escalated into direct confrontations between Lebanese and Syrian army units in the village of Hosh al-Sayyid Ali. The situation nearly spiraled out of control before diplomatic efforts on both sides helped contain the violence.

Since al-Sharaa assumed the Syrian presidency, relations between the two neighbors have remained strained. Former Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati had tried to initiate a cooperative framework during a previous visit, hoping to address contentious issues such as the refugee crisis and border control. However, his efforts were quickly undermined when al-Sharaa responded by questioning the fate of Syrian funds held in Lebanese banks—an exchange Mikati interpreted as a deliberate provocation.

Tensions have only escalated since. The Syrian army has repeatedly announced crackdowns on smugglers along the border, moves often met with disapproval from Beirut. Lebanese officials have occasionally interpreted such operations as politically motivated disruptions, possibly influenced by American and Saudi pressures to rein in border chaos.

Fundamentally, Lebanese-Syrian relations have yet to normalize. The Syrian regime’s current trajectory clashes with the Western-aligned orientation dominating Lebanese politics. Today, Lebanon operates under a joint Saudi-American umbrella, while the U.S. has yet to recognize al-Sharaa’s presidency or lift sanctions against Syria. Meanwhile, Qatar—once a key power broker in Syria—has seen its influence in Lebanon diminish in favor of American and Saudi sway.

Many critical issues remain unresolved between the two countries. Bilateral institutions like the Higher Council and several signed agreements remain dormant. Syria has largely avoided engaging on key files, while Lebanon hesitates to act amid political uncertainty. Even the refugee issue—arguably the most urgent concern—has seen little progress beyond repeated calls for repatriation, with Damascus offering no concrete plan.

The relationship remains murky, shaped by Syria’s evolving internal dynamics and Al-Shara’s political future. Several steps taken by Damascus on trade and economic matters have gone unchallenged by Beirut, highlighting Lebanon’s reluctance—or inability—to address delicate issues.

Lebanese-Syrian relations may never return to their former state. Shifting regional dynamics have created new realities, raising fears in Beirut that Damascus no longer sees value in cooperation on matters like the refugee crisis, especially as Syria itself struggles to absorb returning citizens. Lebanon, in turn, continues to shoulder the burden of new refugee flows, which exceed its capacity.

What remains is a fractured relationship, clouded by mistrust and mutual apprehension. Both sides seem unwilling—or unable—to engage in the candid dialogue needed to reset the terms of engagement.

Now, under Saudi patronage, there may be an opportunity to redraw the contours of this complex relationship. But the path forward is uncertain: Can real progress be achieved while Al-Shara remains in power and Israel continues to occupy parts of Syrian territory? And can Saudi Arabia truly resolve the refugee issue—or will the burden fall yet again on Lebanon?

These questions remain unanswered, as all eyes now turn to Jeddah.