The Lebanese, the Arab world and the international community, did not need to wait two months after the auguration ofa new president and the first government to see the Lebanese crisis unfold in all its complexity. However, the "political dissimulation" practiced by opponents of the presidency and the government kept this truth in suspension—until it surfaced through their slips of the tongue and expressions, as mentioned in Nahj al-Balagha by Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib.

Considering the positions, statements, and equations of the past two months, the crisis can be summed up in a single key formula, omnipresent in three foundational texts: the presidential inauguration speech, the ministerial statement, and the joint communiqué of the recent Lebanese-Saudi meeting in Riyadh. This key phrase is "the monopoly of arms by the Lebanese state," which immediately divided the Lebanese into two camps. On one side are those who openly and firmly support it: the new government, the sovereignist forces, and the independents. On the other side are those who implicitly oppose it by advancing alternative formulas: the "Shiite duo" (Hezbollah and the Amal Movement) and, behind—or in front of—them, Tehran.

But the latter have now dropped their masks. In recent days, they went beyond their reservation to openly declare their rejection of the state's monopoly on arms, invoking the necessity of maintaining a separation between the north and south of the Litani River, as well as the continued state of alert and "finger on the trigger" in the face of Israeli occupation, should diplomatic pressure fail. Their "strategic patience" has worn thin, and they are now hastening to proclaim the failure of diplomacy even before giving it a chance.

Even more striking is the explicit stance of the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri—known for his wisdom and pragmatism—who unequivocally rejected the idea of restricting arms to the state. According to Al-Diyar newspaper, he firmly opposed "any attempt to link reconstruction aid to political or military conditions, whether it concerns the disarmament of the resistance north of the Litani or other internal matters." This message coincides with the statement of Ali Akbar Velayati, advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, who asserted that "the resistance remains strong and enjoys the support of the majority of the Lebanese people." This echoes the declaration of General Qassem Soleimani (former Iranian al Quds Force chief) after the 2018 Lebanese parliamentary elections, when he claimed that the Islamic Republic had secured a majority in the Lebanese Parliament (74 deputies).

Another troubling coincidence: Nabih Berri’s remarks were soon followed by those of Sami Abu Zuhri, a Hamas leader, who insisted that "the weapons of the resistance are a red line and will not be traded for reconstruction aid."

In reality, Tehran, alongside Hezbollah, Berri, and the entire "axis of resistance" coalition, is ignoring significant military and political shifts, as well as changes in power dynamics in the four Arab capitals (and Gaza) they once boasted of controlling. They are also dismissive of a written ceasefire agreement that explicitly demands Hezbollah’s disarm across all Lebanese territory, assigning exclusive responsibility for security to the Lebanese army. This denial has since morphed into a campaign of harassment against the president, via media and social networks, and against the prime minister, who has faced direct opposition in the south of the country. This stance completely undermines adherence to state authority and the Taif Agreement.

This hostility toward the Lebanese state has not been softened, despite Berri’s emphatic praise of President Joseph Aoun’s speech at the Arab summit, which he described as "remarkable." Yet, this tribute carefully omitted the most crucial points: Lebanon’s commitment to its Arab and international alliances and its explicit condemnation of the destruction and occupation of Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and Sanaa—strongholds of the so-called "axis of resistance"—in the name of a Palestinian cause that has been manipulated for political ends.

This frustration has been further fueled by the firm stance of the Lebanese head of state, who reaffirmed—both during a meeting with the Iranian delegation at the Presidential Palace and on multiple other occasions—that the Lebanese "refuse to be dragged into the wars of others on their soil." His detractors, however, argue that there are no "foreign wars" in Lebanon, only one war: that against Israel. As if the Palestinian, Syrian, Iranian, and other proxy conflicts had not already drenched Lebanon in blood and destruction!

The silent reluctance toward the new Lebanese government’s project to reform the state and restore its authority has now transformed into open rejection. What was once mere whispered dissent and restrained annoyance has evolved into explicit declarations against everything that sovereignty entails—against the principle of a unified decision-making power over war and peace.

But, as the saying goes, "every cloud has a silver lining." The state’s determination to enforce its exclusive control over arms has had a revelatory effect. It has forced opponents into the open, compelling them to reveal their true positions and exposing the Lebanese crisis for what it truly is.

This key formula is no trivial matter. It shines a light on the root cause of Lebanon’s discord, offering the Lebanese people, free Arabs, and the world a clear diagnosis—and a remedy proportionate to the crisis eating away at the country.