No observer, analyst, or even rational thinker can realistically expect a revival of past power structures, tainted as they were by constitutional deviations and distortions of the Taif Agreement—both in its explicit text and in its purported, buried records (if they even exist), which are now being exploited beyond their actual content.

All lawmakers who attended and signed the agreement, both living and deceased, have repeatedly affirmed that the idea of permanently assigning the Ministry of Finance to the Shiite community (via the so-called “third signature”) was neither ratified nor institutionalized. At most, it was briefly debated before being dismissed.

It is well-documented that numerous issues concerning governmental powers were discussed, including the Finance Ministry. However, these debates remained theoretical exercises and were never formalized into binding decisions in the final text. If the allocation of this portfolio had indeed been settled since 1989, how do we explain the fact that, following the constitutional amendments, 19 finance ministers have served, 11 of whom were non-Shiite? What eroded this precedent and the principle of rotation between 1990 and 2011 if not a strategy of incremental political dominance, strengthened by the post-2006 war dynamics, the 2008 incursions, and the 2011 "Black Shirts" coup?

More critically, this issue raises a fundamental breach of the separation of powers, enshrined in the Constitution’s preamble. By granting the head of the legislative branch influence over executive decrees through the finance minister’s mandatory signature, a structural imbalance is created—one that blurs responsibilities and fuels sectarian tensions. If the Speaker of Parliament can dictate executive decisions via his representative in the Finance Ministry, what prevents the Prime Minister or President from demanding similar influence over parliamentary decisions?

Numerous instances exist where finance ministers affiliated with the "duo" have obstructed institutional operations and paralyzed state functions. Two major examples stand out: blocking the formation of the Supreme Judicial Council to derail the Beirut port blast investigation and withholding promotions for army and security officers unless specific political gains were secured. These actions sparked direct conflicts with the Presidency and exacerbated sectarian sensitivities.

Had it not been for these precedents of obstruction and sectarian maneuvering, no one would have contested the minister’s sectarian affiliation or authority. After all, previous non-Shiite finance ministers never faced widespread objections or distrust regarding their performance.

It is no secret that the primary obstacle to government formation has been the insistence of Amal and Hezbollah on keeping the Finance Ministry, prompting other political and sectarian forces—particularly Sunnis and Christians—to demand similar guarantees, refusing to allow a singular exception to the principle of ministerial rotation.

For the next government to materialize, it must uphold equality among political forces and sects, avoiding the trap of perpetuating outdated power dynamics. Both the President’s inaugural speech and the Prime Minister-designate’s mandate emphasized a break from the burdens of the past, setting the stage for a governance model that meets three key expectations: a Lebanese popular mandate, an Arab regional backing, and international scrutiny.

Succumbing to this unconstitutional status quo would open the floodgates to further illegitimate concessions, perpetuating the cycle of failure and corruption that has plagued Lebanon for 35 years.

It is no exaggeration to say that the greatest challenge to forming a functional government lies in preserving an outdated privilege within a newly promised system—one where a single faction dictates its ministerial portfolios while others are denied the same right.

Lebanese citizens hope that the logic of “might make right,” which has dominated for the past two decades, does not prevail again—where the latest military parades in the South, the return of fighters, and provocative demonstrations serve as a bargaining chip for political gains.

They also hope that Speaker Nabih Berri’s and Amal’s recent distancing from Hezbollah’s military displays is not merely a tactical move to secure the Finance Ministry as a trade-off. While signs of divergence within the Shiite duo have surfaced—most notably in the extension of the ceasefire—these differences could present an opportunity for greater political pluralism, mirroring the diversity of other sectarian blocs.

If this transformation is realized—moving beyond monopolization, coercion, and street intimidation—there would be no justification for denying any ministry to any sect.

The solutions exist—they are anchored in proper power balances and real, uninflated political weight, free from intimidation and coercion.