Lebanon is witnessing unprecedented clarity and decisiveness in prioritizing solutions to its crises for the first time in its modern history—particularly in the last fifty years. This shift has been especially evident in the aftermath of the most recent war, with all its consequences, revelations, and tragedies.

Unlike previous wars, where solutions were fragmented, incomplete, or driven by inverted priorities, today's approach signals a break from the past. Historically, efforts often targeted symptoms rather than root causes, allowing problems to fester and leading to the collapse process Lebanon has endured in recent years.

The new presidential term, both at the leadership and government level, is tackling critical issues: making key appointments, launching financial and economic reforms, and addressing development needs. However, it is fully aware that all these efforts will falter—just as they have in the past—if Lebanon fails to resolve the most urgent issue: reclaiming full sovereignty and implementing the central demand shared across all Lebanese, Arab, and international frameworks—namely, placing all weapons exclusively in the hands of the legitimate state and dismantling all militias, Lebanese and foreign alike.

These frameworks include the presidential oath, the ministerial statement, the Taif Agreement, UN Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1680, and 1701, and the ceasefire understandings between Lebanon and Israel. All of them converge on one fundamental principle: consolidating Lebanese state authority through its legitimate institutions alone. The ceasefire document even outlines six such state forces: the army, internal security forces, general security, state security, customs, and municipal police.

Yet, despite official recognition of this priority, the government continues to run into Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm. The group interprets the ceasefire agreement selectively, citing a division between areas south and north of the Litani River to justify retaining its “resistance” arsenal—even though it had previously agreed to abandon its military role once it distanced itself from confrontation lines with Israel and dismantled its weapon stockpiles in that area.

Both the state and Hezbollah know that the era of unauthorized weapons must come to an end—not only due to the war's fallout and mounting international pressure but also because of an overwhelming Lebanese consensus that calls for building a functional, stable state. They are thus compelled to establish a short-term, actionable roadmap to settle the arms issue, lest all efforts at reform and recovery be rendered meaningless.

The first step must be a transparent, open dialogue within state institutions, particularly in the Cabinet, to confront the arms issue directly. Government officials—especially ministers—must align their positions with those of President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji. This should be followed by in-depth meetings with Hezbollah’s leadership and all of its internal factions—assuming the circulating reports about internal disagreements are accurate. Only then can a carefully calculated implementation timeline begin.

If Hezbollah is genuinely committed to reconstruction, it must disarm. The two cannot coexist: reconstruction and armed non-state actors are parallel lines that never meet. No matter what justifications are offered, weapons outside state control only serve to undo what is being rebuilt. Lebanon cannot survive under a dual-armed authority.

Moreover, disarming militias would be the most effective way to counter the current dilemma posed by the normalization-or-war binary. Removing illegal weapons would provide Lebanon with powerful leverage in adhering to the 1949 Ceasefire Agreement and resolving border disputes—until a broader Arab-Israeli settlement is reached.

This is how clear Lebanon’s path to recovery has become. Yes, reform and reconstruction can begin—but only under internal, Arab, and international guarantees that prevent their collapse should the country backslide into slogans like “resistance,” “support,” or “unity of fronts”—all of which are recipes for renewed war and destruction. The disarmament roadmap must not be delayed or lost in political fog.

It’s also worth recalling that even a few crude, unidentified rockets launched from north of the Litani toward northern Israel nearly reignited a full-scale war—averted only by Lebanon’s adept diplomacy. But no one can guarantee such luck next time.

Whether or not Hezbollah denies involvement in such incidents is irrelevant as long as the group maintains ties with both Lebanese and non-Lebanese factions within the same regional axis—receiving directives from Tehran—or as long as hardline wings within the movement remain loyal to Iranian leadership rather than to Lebanese political authority.

It’s also essential to recognize that distracting from the arms issue with other proposals—like a single-district electoral law or abolishing political sectarianism (aimed at shifting demographic balances and undermining the power-sharing agreement)—will not succeed in derailing or diluting the arms resolution agenda. Such tactics are reminiscent of the Assad regime's sleight of hand: pulling rabbits out of the hat under the guise of external control.

Yes, for the first time, Lebanon is steadily moving forward on an irreversible path to salvation. It no longer faces multiple options—just one: a firm decision to reclaim sovereignty and legitimate control over all weapons, exclusively in the state’s hands.

As for the so-called “defense strategy”—once brandished but always dodged—it too belongs to the past, much like the outdated “tripartite formula” abandoned by the current government. In its place will rise a comprehensive “national security strategy” involving all state sectors. The difference between the two could not be starker—a comparison that merits deeper exploration in due time.