Is the ongoing war of words between Lebanese state officials and certain partisan and religious figures truly in the interest of defending Lebanon?
Is now really the time for division?
Is this how Israel will be forced to withdraw from the South?
Is this the way to support state legitimacy and extend Lebanon’s sovereignty across all its territory?
And does this rhetorical sparring truly safeguard Hezbollah’s weapons as a defense of Lebanon’s rights?
One thing is certain: internal discord serves foreign interests more than any military or political defeat could.
The reality is, the state “protected by the resistance’s weapons” is not the state the Lebanese people aspire to build. Hezbollah’s arms did not shield a unified nation—they defended a parallel entity that operated in its own interest, often at the expense of the Lebanese themselves.
Driven by its own calculations, Hezbollah opened a front in support of a war unrelated to Lebanon, leading to thousands of deaths—among its fighters, leaders, and civilians—displacing over a million people, only to eventually call for a ceasefire and accept its terms, both public and hidden. Now, the group appears to be placing unacceptable conditions on implementing only parts of that ceasefire.
Given Hezbollah’s well-known positions, how can the agreement truly be enforced?
It is now almost redundant to say that a full implementation of the ceasefire is the key to any progress. Initially, Hezbollah was the one to request a ceasefire. Now it has shifted the narrative, claiming it forced Israel to accept the deal.
So, what is Hezbollah demanding for the ceasefire to proceed?
Officially, the party is calling for a national dialogue committee that includes all protagonists to define a comprehensive defense strategy, clarifying its role and the role of its arms within the framework of the state. In the meantime—and even before such talks happen—it insists the state must liberate all Israeli-occupied land and rebuild the areas affected by war.
While these are undeniably national demands, achieving them is a long-term project—one that hinges on Hezbollah committing to the ceasefire agreement, which stipulates relinquishing its weapons across all Lebanese territory.
Recently, there have been mixed signals from the government regarding the ceasefire and Hezbollah’s arms—statements from the deputy prime minister, the environment minister, the foreign minister, and finally the prime minister himself, who firmly declared that the era of “the people, the army, and the resistance” is over, and that the monopoly on arms belongs to the state.
Yet such words are far from enough to convince Hezbollah to shift its stance.
The president spoke of a “national security strategy” for Lebanon—an approach that includes not only military defense but also economic growth, food, health, and medical security, financial reforms, the strengthening of state institutions and sovereignty, investment in education, eradication of illiteracy, public debt reduction, economic rationalization, administrative streamlining, and infrastructure modernization. It also means enabling the army—through recruitment, training, and armament—to control border areas effectively.
A real national security strategy also requires an independent judiciary and the fair application of laws across the board.
We do not know how much of Hezbollah’s arsenal Israel has managed to destroy, or how much remains. But if there are still weapons, their impact is unlikely to exceed that of those already used. Still, Israel continues to strike whenever it locates any.
So, between Hezbollah’s demands and the government’s stated willingness to implement the ceasefire—including the international resolutions at its core—why doesn’t the state begin by taking control of Palestinian weapons, both inside and outside the camps?