Since the victory of the Khomeini revolution on February 11, 1979, and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, relations between Iran and Lebanon have never been those of two sovereign states engaging on equal footing. From the outset, Tehran exploited Lebanon’s sectarian divisions and the very structure of its political and social system to infiltrate it with its politico-religious project, making the country a prime arena for exporting its revolution. This strategy materialized with the arrival of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Baalbek in 1982 and the subsequent founding of Hezbollah.

With the end of the Lebanese Civil War and Syria’s takeover of Lebanon in the early 1990s, Iran consolidated its influence, taking advantage of its "speculative partner’s" grip on the Shiite community to strengthen its presence, particularly through the military expansion of Hezbollah. After the "war of the brothers" between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah—an indirect proxy war between Iran and Syria that began in March 1988—the two patrons managed to structure their relations, which resulted in the signing of a peace agreement between the two Shiite factions on November 9, 1990.

The withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon on April 26, 2005, followed by Bashar al-Assad’s entanglement in the Syrian civil war from March 15, 2011, further amplified Iranian influence in Lebanon. This coincided with the emergence of the so-called "Shiite Crescent" after the fall of Baghdad and the ousting of Saddam Hussein on April 9, 2003.

However, Tehran alone cannot be held responsible for its interventionism in Lebanon. A significant part of the responsibility lies with the Lebanese political class, some of whom pledged allegiance to Iran, while others resigned themselves to the status quo, leaving only a small minority in opposition. Faced with the rise of a "mini-state" within the state, Lebanese leaders capitulated, perfectly illustrating the saying: "It is not the beauty that unveils itself, but the absence of men that compels her to do so"—a harsh indictment of the absence of true statesmen capable of defending even the semblance of national sovereignty.

Iran’s Tight Grip

Iranian officials have never concealed their control over Beirut, going so far as to claim their influence publicly. This was exemplified by the statement of General Yahya Rahim Safavi, military advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, who declared on June 13, 2024, that "Iranians have reached the Mediterranean Sea three times: twice under the Achaemenid kings, Cyrus I around 500 B.C. and Xerxes I in 480 B.C., and most recently through Lebanese Hezbollah, which embodies the ideological extension of the Iranian revolution." Despite the audacity of these remarks, no Lebanese official dared to challenge Tehran or summon its ambassador for clarification.

Following the October 7 war, Iran intensified its role as the "orchestrator" of its regional axis, promoting its "unity of fronts" strategy. Iranian officials frequently visited Lebanon, leading meetings with Hezbollah, Hamas, the IRGC, and other factions, openly declaring that the fate of Lebanon’s front was tied to the ceasefire in Gaza. Meanwhile, Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati candidly admitted on Al Jadeed TV on October 13, 2023: "Do you seriously believe that the government controls war and peace? What world are you living in? Curaçao?"

Iranian interference in Lebanese affairs reached a peak when Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, during an interview with Le Figaro in Geneva on October 17, 2024, stated that Tehran was "ready to negotiate with Paris on implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701" while positioning Iran as a mediator for a ceasefire in southern Lebanon. Simultaneously, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared on January 4, 2025: "The future of the resistance in the region is promising, and Hezbollah is systematically rebuilding its strength."

The Joseph Aoun Era: A Shift away from the Iranian Hegemony?

Even after General Joseph Aoun was elected President of the Republic—and despite the clarity and firmness of his inaugural speech on national sovereignty—Iran wasted no time asserting its influence. On January 9, 2025, Iran’s ambassador to Beirut, Mojtaba Amani, congratulated the Lebanese people via a message on X, dictating his directives: "The golden triangle of 'Army-People-Resistance' must endure, as the resistance is an integral part of Lebanon."

Iranian interference resurfaced again on January 31, 2025, when Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Vahid Jalal Zadeh, visited Beirut, urging Lebanese authorities to "provide the best possible care for Syrian refugees who were forced to flee to Lebanon due to recent developments in Syria."

However, January 23, 2025, marked a defining moment in Lebanon-Iran relations, coinciding with the simultaneous deaths of Hezbollah’s Secretary-Generals Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine. Receiving an Iranian delegation led by Ghalibaf, Araghchi, and Amani, President Joseph Aoun seized the opportunity to assert, with diplomacy yet firmness, Lebanon’s determination to recalibrate its relations with Iran:

"Lebanon is committed to maintaining the best possible relations with Tehran, in the interest of both nations and their peoples."

By extending a "Khush-aamdiid" (Persian for "Welcome") in the Aoun era, the Lebanese president subtly signaled a paradigm shift: from now on, equality and mutual respect for sovereignty would be the foundation of bilateral relations.

A Return to Arab Identity and a Cautionary Message to Iran

Joseph Aoun used this meeting to realign Lebanon with its natural Arab sphere. He welcomed the outcomes of the recent Riyadh summit, in which Iran also participated. He stressed the importance of the two-state solution for the Palestinian issue and the recognition of the Palestinian Authority as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Aoun turned Iran’s own principles against it, reminding Tehran of Article 9 of the Iranian Constitution, which underscores the indivisibility of Iran’s independence and territorial integrity and prohibits foreign interference.

By adopting a statesman’s approach, Joseph Aoun broke long-standing taboos and affirmed that "Lebanon is tired of being a battleground for foreign wars." This statement sent a strong message to the Lebanese people: restoring national sovereignty is no longer just an aspiration but a tangible objective.