The appointment of Judge Nawaf Salam to form the first government of President Joseph Aoun’s term has injected additional momentum into the wave of anticipation sparked by Aoun’s arrival at the Presidential Palace. The Lebanese welcomed this development with optimism, believing that the train of change had set in motion and that a new approach to government formation was on the horizon—one that could address Lebanon’s existential and critical challenges while keeping pace with the region’s evolving political landscape.

They hoped for speed, not haste, to capitalize on this momentum and the international climate, ensuring that pressing and urgent deadlines were met. These include implementing the provisions of the ceasefire agreement—most notably, ensuring that weapons remain exclusively in the hands of legitimate state forces and closing the chapter on Hezbollah’s arms—launching reconstruction efforts, accelerating reforms to unlock aid from friendly nations and international institutions, and taking serious steps toward financial and economic recovery, restructuring, and curbing the erosion of Lebanese deposits frozen in banks.

The public expected Salam to shatter the “idols of heresy” that have plagued the government formation process—practices that are neither constitutional nor aligned with the national pact. They hoped he would dismantle the remnants of the coup against the Taif Agreement, which took place 35 years ago, along with its distorted concepts and flawed criteria. While Salam introduced four key standards for his government:

-High national competencies.

-Separation of parliamentary and ministerial roles.

-Prohibition of ministerial candidates from running in municipal and parliamentary elections.

-Exclusion of partisan figures from the cabinet.

These standards, intended to break the cycle of traditional government formation, avoided challenging the entrenched “idols.” In some cases, they even reinforced them, creating unnecessary complications.

Salam did not touch the “idol” of classifying ministerial portfolios into sovereign, service, and ordinary ministries—a division that should have been abolished to establish the principle that every ministry is important in its own right, or else it should not exist. He also refrained from addressing the “idol” of limiting sovereign ministries to four sects: Maronites, Orthodox Christians, Shiites, and Sunnis. Expanding this scope to include other sects would have sent a positive signal.

Furthermore, according to leaked information, Salam appears inclined to reinforce the “idol” of restricting the Ministry of Finance to the Shiite duo, despite his repeated assertion that “no portfolio is the exclusive right of any sect, nor is any sect barred from holding a particular portfolio.” Instead, he should have introduced a system of ministerial rotation to avoid fueling public outrage over the continued dominance of the Finance Ministry by one political faction. This portfolio has been used as a tool of blackmail through the minister’s signing authority, leading to one failure after another and culminating in the country’s current collapse—exemplified by the disastrous approval of the salary scale law based on flawed studies and inaccurate figures.

At the very least, Salam should have insisted that this portfolio not remain with the Shiite duo, even if it were to stay within the Shiite community as an exception. This would have aligned him with Lebanese Forces (Christian political party) leader Samir Geagea, who supports such a move to prevent the Shiite community from feeling targeted, given that its current predicament stems from the duo’s own misguided decisions—chief among them Hezbollah’s entanglement of Lebanon in the war it launched on October 8, 2023, under the banners of “unified fronts” and “support for Gaza.”

Undoubtedly, everyone agrees on the necessity of selecting high national competencies. However, a common misconception has emerged, equating competence solely with the length of one’s CV, the number of degrees obtained, and their issuing institutions. Yet, these qualifications alone are insufficient unless coupled with expertise in public affairs, policymaking, effective governance, and political acumen—fundamental skills without which one would be better suited for an advisory or managerial role rather than a ministerial position. Political decision-making is the gateway to resolving all other financial, economic, administrative, sovereign, and military issues.

Likewise, the separation of parliamentary and ministerial roles is not a constitutional requirement in Lebanon. While a commendable step, it is not necessary because ministers cannot hold themselves accountable, but rather because both roles are so demanding that each requires undivided attention. If Salam truly seeks accountability and wishes to prevent the government from turning into a “mini-parliament,” he should form a government with a parliamentary majority that governs, while a parliamentary minority assumes the role of opposition and oversight. This would break the “idol” of national unity governments, which have become reminiscent of l’école des fans.

Similarly, the prohibition of ministerial candidates from running in municipal and parliamentary elections is not enshrined in the Lebanese Constitution. The real issue is not entering Parliament but rather preventing the misuse of public office for personal political gain. What is needed is the appointment of statesmen, not opportunists seeking power.

As for the exclusion of partisan figures from the government, this is itself an “idol of heresy” that Salam, whether intentionally or unintentionally, has added to the formation process. It is an unjust discrimination against those committed to political parties. In any functioning democracy, parties serve as the natural framework for political activity. While many Lebanese parties have poor track records, this does not justify a sweeping generalization, especially when some parties have demonstrated integrity, competence, and productivity—such as the Lebanese Forces, whose ministers earned praise even from their adversaries in the pro-Iranian axis before their allies. Moreover, certain so-called “independent” ministers in Lebanon have proven to be just as corrupt and clientelist as their partisan counterparts. To suggest that party affiliation is inherently incompatible with competence and integrity is misleading and a blatant demonization of political parties.

Lebanon cannot afford the luxury of time. If the country fails to capitalize on the current international climate, the opportunity may not present itself again in the foreseeable future. Any delay in forming the government will inevitably erode the momentum of the new presidential term. The designated prime minister still has a chance to reassess his approach and take decisive action to break the “idols of heresy” in the government formation process—for the sake of Lebanon and its people.