On Friday, July 5, 2024, the second round of the Iranian presidential election took place, less than fifty days after the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash near the border with Azerbaijan, along with his Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and an accompanying delegation. In this election, the reformist candidate Massoud Pezeshkian won 53.3% of the votes, against 44.3% for his conservative rival Saeed Jalili.

Following this election, numerous speculations have emerged about the direction Iran will take both internally and externally under Pezeshkian's presidency. A 71-year-old cardiologist, Pezeshkian is known for his criticism of the morality police, which enforces Islamic norms of behavior and dress in public. This institution is particularly controversial among young Iranians in cities who see it as an infringement on their freedoms. His opposition to the morality police has therefore appealed to this youth, visible in videos circulating on social media showing young people dancing, waving green flags, and organizing festive car parades. This phenomenon indicates that the new president might adopt a policy of social liberalization, offering young Iranians and liberal circles more freedom of expression and emancipatory aspirations.

As a doctor from the Iranian middle class, Pezeshkian could direct his presidency towards strengthening this social class. Moreover, his affiliation with the reformist current, generally representative of the interests of the Iranian bourgeoisie and capitalist class, suggests increased support for the private sector and business at the expense of the public or state-supported sector.

Observers believe that Pezeshkian could restructure social protests, formerly expressions of rejection of conservative norms, into movements framed by the structures of the Islamic Republic, rather than being expressed on the streets. His election could also encourage partnerships between the public and private sectors within a state-directed framework but with significant room for the private sector.

In terms of foreign policy, Pezeshkian has often criticized conservatives for the isolation they have imposed on Iran. He has particularly reproached their lack of commitment to relations with the West. The new president has repeatedly called for "constructive negotiations" with Western powers to renew the 2015 nuclear deal, which limited Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, before the United States withdrew in 2018 under President Donald Trump. This puts him in direct opposition to his rival Jalili, who prefers not to cooperate with the West and opposes the renewal of the deal, which he sees as a threat to Iranian national security. However, Pezeshkian is not expected to seek to open Iran further to the West at the expense of its relations with Eurasian nations, considered strategic. Under Raisi's presidency, Iran signed a strategic partnership worth $450 billion with China over 25 years and became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, platforms for international relations opposing the Western-dominated system.

Although Pezeshkian belongs to the reformist current, generally reluctant towards Iranian alliances with certain Arab groups and resistance movements, it is unlikely that Iran will reduce its support for these factions. Strategic national security issues remain under the direction of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who holds supreme authority and commands the armed forces. Frictions between Khamenei and Pezeshkian are possible, but they are not expected to compromise the state's strategic orientations. The Supreme Leader has already collaborated with reformist presidents like Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) and Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), the latter having overseen a significant increase in material and military support for Iran's allied factions.

Finally, Pezeshkian's candidacy has helped raise the voter turnout in the second round of the presidential election to 50%, compared to about 40% in the first round, the lowest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This renewed participation aims to legitimize the regime in the face of Western criticism.